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The Conservative Project to ‘Break the Link between British Courts 
and Strasbourg’: Rhetoric or Reality? 
 
Helen Fenwick and Roger Masterman

 
 
The current Conservative government has pledged to repeal the Human Rights Act and introduce a British Bill 
of Rights, with the specific aim of ‘breaking the link’ created by s.2 of the Human Rights Act between the 
domestic courts and Strasbourg. On the reasonable assumption that the Bill of Rights will include a new version 
of s.2 HRA, reflecting that pledge, this article will examine the implications of this proposal, beginning by 
exploring the nature of the current ‘link’ between the British courts and Strasbourg in s.2 HRA, and considering 
the extent to which that link has already been significantly weakened. Taking that weakening into account, it 
will go on to consider the basis for the Conservative proposal, and the options available to the Conservatives in 
breaking that link in a BBoR, taking account of the introduction of limitation clauses in a BBoR and of the 
possibility of according Strasbourg judgments against the UK an advisory status only. Finally, taking account 
the European Court’s recent movement towards ‘enhanced’ subsidiarity, it will examine the possible beneficial 
or negative consequences for the protection of human rights in Britain of reliance on a BBoR intended to be 
interpreted and applied independently of Strasbourg influence. 
 
Key words: British Bill of Rights, Human Rights Act, European Court of Human Rights.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the febrile aftermath of the June 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum, and of the decision of the UK 
Supreme Court that Parliament must vote to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon,
1
 the 
                                                          

 Durham Law School.   
 2 
commitment of the Conservative Government to replace the Human Rights Act (HRA) with a 
British Bill of Rights (BBoR) has been somewhat overshadowed.  However, that commitment 
gains considerably in significance as a result of ‘Brexit’ since, once the UK has withdrawn 
from the EU, it can be presumed that the EU Fundamental Charter of Rights will no longer be 
applicable in domestic law
2
 and the potential for the UK’s human rights framework to 
undergo significant further amendment will be considerable. The Government’s 
determination to repeal the HRA was reaffirmed in the 2016 Queen’s Speech and, while a 
draft BBoR has not been published, one aspect of it can be viewed as clearly established: it 
will reflect long-standing Conservative hostility, not to the text of the ECHR itself, but to its 
attendant jurisprudence, and in particular to the ‘living instrument’ or ‘living tree’3 approach, 
which influences domestic law via s.2 HRA. That hostility was reaffirmed by Theresa May 
during her campaign to become the leader of the Conservative party when she attacked 
certain Strasbourg decisions in the ‘living instrument’ mode.4 It was also reflected in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 
WLR 583. 
2
 The Charter has been found to apply directly in domestic law: Cases C/293/12 and C/594/12 Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources & Others and Seitlinger and Others 
[2015] 1 QB 127; [2014] 3 CMLR 44. See further: House of Lords EU Committee, The UK, the EU and a 
British Bill of Rights, HL Paper 139 (9 May 2016); ‘an inquiry to assess the impact of a Bill of Rights on the 
UK’s obligations under the EU Charter, and, conversely, of those obligations on a British Bill of Rights’, [6].  
See also the recent comment on this matter: ‘Top Lawyers warn of Human Rights Crisis after Brexit’, The 
Guardian 21 February 2017 (available at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/feb/21/top-lawyers-warn-of-
human-rights-crisis-after-brexit.) 
3
 In Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, Lord Bingham of Cornhill described the ECHR, at 703, as a ‘living tree 
capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits’. 
4
 ‘UK must leave the European Convention on Human Rights, says Theresa May’, The Guardian, 25 April 
2016.  
 3 
Conservatives’ 2015 election manifesto, which included a pledge to abolish the HRA and 
replace it with a British Bill of Rights that would ‘break the formal link between British 
courts and the European Court of Human Rights,’ and render the UK Supreme Court the 
‘ultimate arbiter of human rights matters in the UK’.5 
In the wake of the 2015 General Election Prime Minister David Cameron said that 
plans to repeal the HRA would be published within the first 100 days of the new 
administration.
6
  Untrammelled by Liberal Democrat Coalition partners, it appeared that the 
promise made in the 2010 Conservative manifesto would finally be put into practice. The 
Queen’s Speech 2015, however, did not refer to legislation that would effect such repeal, but 
merely to proposals to introduce a BBoR. This commitment was repeated in the 2016 
Queen’s Speech, and – following the June 2016 in/out referendum on EU membership and 
David Cameron’s replacement by Theresa May – the new Secretary of State for Justice and 
Lord Chancellor again reiterated the Government’s intention to replace the HRA with a 
BBoR.
7
 The draft Bill of Rights will not, however, be published until after completion of the 
‘Brexit’ negotiations.8    
The 2014 Conservative Party document, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The 
Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws, proposed that the 
‘formal requirement for our Courts to treat the Strasbourg Court as creating legal precedent 
                                                          
5
 See: Strong leadership. A clear economic plan. A brighter, more secure future, available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto; The Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The 
Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws (October 2014), p.6. 
6
 See eg: Oliver Wright, ‘Unshackled from coalition partners, Tories get ready to push radical agenda’, The 
Independent, 9 May 2015. 
7
 House of Commons Justice Committee, Oral Evidence, The Work of the Secretary of State HC620, 7 
September 2016, Q78-Q91. 
8
 HC Debates, Vol.618, Col.355, 8 December 2016 (Jeremy Wright QC MP).  
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for the UK (sic)’9 would be undone under a new BBoR. On the reasonable assumption, 
therefore, that the BBoR will include a new version of s.2 HRA, reflecting those 2014-16 
pledges, this article will examine their implications, beginning by exploring the nature of the 
current ‘link’ between the British courts and Strasbourg in s.2 HRA, and considering the 
extent to which that link has already been significantly weakened. It will go on to consider 
the basis for the Conservative proposal, and the options available to the Conservatives in 
breaking that link in a BBoR, taking account of the introduction of limitation clauses in a 
BBoR and of the possibility of according judgments against the UK an advisory status only. 
The relation between those options and the current stance taken by the judiciary to s.2 will be 
evaluated. Finally, taking account the European Court’s recent movement towards ‘enhanced’ 
subsidiarity, it will examine the possible beneficial or negative consequences for the 
protection of human rights in Britain of reliance on a BBoR intended to be interpreted and 
applied independently of Strasbourg influence. It will take the stance that maintaining 
governmental accountability via the enforcement of human rights standards is a clear good, 
but will consider the possibility that an enrichment of rights might arise, enabling inter alia 
such accountability, due to the diminution of Strasbourg influence under a BBoR. It is not 
intended to discuss the matter of changing the relationship between Strasbourg and domestic 
courts and repeal of the HRA in relation to the devolved institutions since that extremely 
controversial issue has been side-stepped by the Conservative leadership so far. Similarly, the 
continued international law obligation placed on the state to abide by final judgments at 
Strasbourg against it under Article 46 ECHR will form a sub-theme in the article, but raises 
wider issues that go beyond the scope of this piece.  
 
                                                          
9
 The Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (October 2014), p.5. 
 5 
THE ‘LINK’ BETWEEN BRITISH COURTS AND STRASBOURG 
Section 2(1) HRA: Creating ‘legal precedent[s] for the UK’?10 
As a preliminary, the nature of the ‘formal’ linkage referred to in the 2015 Manifesto requires 
unpicking. A precedential link between national courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights is not a requirement of the Convention; nor is it a requirement of the HRA. Under s.2 
HRA, in seeking to interpret the Convention rights under the HRA, the domestic judiciary 
must merely ‘take into account’ any relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence; the intention 
underlying s.2(1) was that the jurisprudence would not be viewed as binding.
11
 The problem 
from the Conservative perspective stems from the way in which s.2(1) has been interpreted 
and applied, rather than from its wording. The finding of the House of Lords in Ullah,
12
 that 
judges should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court and should 
offer domestic protections for the Convention rights which were neither narrower nor more 
expansive than those afforded at Strasbourg – ‘the mirror principle’13 – was indicative of an 
early tendency to treat the Strasbourg jurisprudence as effectively determinative of disputes 
in the ECHR context arising in the domestic sphere.
14
 The sentiments behind such an 
approach were noted in the UK Supreme Court decision in Ambrose v Harris in which Lord 
                                                          
10
 The Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (October 2014), p.5. 
11
 See further: F. Klug and H. Wildbore ‘Follow or lead? The Human Rights Act and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ [2010] EHRLR 621. 
12
 R (on the application of Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323.  
13
 See: J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720. 
14
 R. Masterman, ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to Strasbourg?’ [2004] 
PL 725; R. Masterman, ‘Aspiration or Foundation? The Status of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the 
“Convention rights” in Domestic Law’ in H. Fenwick, G. Phillipson and R. Masterman (eds), Judicial 
Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 6 
Hope, giving the leading judgment, said that ‘Parliament never intended to give the courts of 
this country the power to give a more generous scope to those rights than that which was to 
be found in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court. To do so would have the effect of 
changing them from Convention rights, based on the treaty obligation, into free-standing 
rights of the court’s own creation.’15 From that perspective, replication of Strasbourg 
protections in the domestic context provided certainty and predictability consistently with the 
intent of Parliament in enacting the HRA.  
But such a stance was inevitably unlikely to enhance the dialogic opportunities that 
exist between Strasbourg and the domestic courts.
16
 As Lord Irvine has said: ‘[a] court which 
subordinates itself to follow another’s rulings cannot enter into a dialogue with its superior in 
any meaningful sense’.17 The perception, however, of subordination of domestic courts to 
Strasbourg judgments as ‘precedents’ that the Ullah-based approach engendered was 
recognised by the Coalition Government-appointed Bill of Rights Commission, which found 
that a reassertion of the national dimensions of human rights law through the adoption of a 
UK Bill of Rights could ‘result in greater domestic “ownership” of rights’ and a reduction in 
the commonly-held perception that rights – as protected under the HRA scheme – are 
‘foreign’18 or a ‘European imposition.’19 Reporting in 2012, the Commission noted that there 
was a substantial body of opinion that wanted to emphasise that courts were free to depart 
from Strasbourg.
20
  The Commission noted that JUSTICE, for instance, had argued that:  
                                                          
15
 [2011] UKSC 43; [2011] 1 WLR 2435, [19]. 
16
 Baroness Hale ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’ 12(1) HRLR (2012) 
65. 
17
 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’ [2012] PL 237, 247.  
18
 Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights: The Choice Before Us (December 2012), [7.27].  
19
 Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK?, HL165-I/HC150-I (August 2008), [94].  
20
 Ibid., [56] and [57].  
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Although there is a clear line of case law which suggests our judges consider 
themselves [bound by the Strasbourg case-law], there is nothing in the HRA which 
requires this approach ... The judges themselves appear to be moving away from this 
unduly restrictive approach ... Rightly we consider that the language in the Human 
Rights Act 1998 strikes an appropriate balance between respect for the boundaries of 
the Convention and encouragement of the development of independent domestic 
rights jurisprudence.
21
   
 
But although, as JUSTICE noted, it cannot be said that the judges have confined themselves 
only to ‘taking account’ of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the Commission did not propose a 
change to the position under s.2 HRA:  
 
There was also a clear majority in favour of maintaining the requirement in the 
Human Rights Act on UK courts to ‘take into account’ relevant judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights with three quarters of those responding on this issue 
wanting to maintain the current formulation…[often] on the basis that our courts were 
now correctly interpreting the Act’s wording in this respect having failed on some 
occasions to do so in the past.
22
 
 
In spite of the Commission’s partial acknowledgement of a subtle refinement of the courts’ 
approach to the interpretation of s.2(1) of the Act, such jurisprudential developments appear 
not to have had an impact on the Conservative leadership’s desire to ‘break the link’ between 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., [56].  
22
 Ibid., [58]. 
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domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights.  Nor has the dilution of Ullah that 
has recently occurred, the matter to which this article now turns.  
 
A ‘retreat from Ullah’?23 
The mirror metaphor has been used to indicate that s.2 HRA requires the domestic courts to 
replicate Strasbourg’s approach, and therefore to show restraint where the Court has not 
spoken or not spoken clearly on an issue, since its approach cannot be reflected domestically.  
Two phases in the approach to the interpretation of s.2 can be identified over the 16 years that 
the HRA has been in force, moving, broadly speaking, from full adherence to the mirror 
principle in the early post-HRA period, to partial adherence to that principle.
24
 Judicial 
supporters of the ‘full mirror principle’ model cemented in law by Ullah25 in 2004 considered 
that the domestic courts’ judgments should not outpace Strasbourg and should mirror 
Strasbourg where it has spoken, with only highly exceptional departure. That ‘mirror’ 
approach sees domestic courts effectively operating as local proxies for the Strasbourg 
court.
26
 It has been espoused by a number of the senior judges, according to their judgments
27
 
and extra-judicial contributions.
28
 Some, such as Lord Hoffmann in particular, have been at 
times very reluctant members of this camp, as he made clear in AF.
29
   
                                                          
23
 The phrase is from Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67; [2015] AC 901, [103]. 
24
 The discussion of these phases draws partly on Lord Wilson’s timeline set out in Moohan. 
25
 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26; [2004] 2 AC 323, [20]. 
26
 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Quark Fishing Ltd [2005] UKHL 57; 
[2006] 1 AC 529, [34].  
27
 See in particular the well-known comment of Lord Rodger in AF (No.3), ‘Strasbourg has spoken, the case is 
closed’ [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 269, [98].  
28
 P. Sales, ‘Strasbourg jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: a response to Lord Irvine’ [2012] PL 253. 
29
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 269.  
 9 
One basis for adopting the full mirror principle was explained in R (Al-Skeini) v 
Secretary of State for Defence by Lord Brown who found that the domestic courts should not 
outpace Strasbourg because if they were to construe a Convention right ‘too widely’, the UK 
could not apply to the European Court to have the decision corrected, whereas, ‘in the 
obverse situation, the aggrieved individual could apply to have it corrected’.30  Baroness Hale 
has said on this: ‘it is more a question of respect for the balances recently struck by the 
legislature than a question of the extent of our powers.  One reason for this is that an 
aggrieved complainant can always go to Strasbourg if she disagrees with our assessment, but 
the United Kingdom cannot’.31  Thus she indicated that relying on a full manifestation of the 
mirror principle would appear to avoid the institutional imbalance that might otherwise occur.  
Under this approach domestic judges should adhere to the mirror principle in order to 
‘Strasbourg-proof’ the case: if the applicant would probably win at Strasbourg they should 
win domestically.
32
 But that argument does not take account of the fact that governments 
have methods open to them, which victims do not, to seek to influence the interpretation and 
application of the ECHR, via the European institutions. For example, the UK’s Chairmanship 
of the Council of Europe allowed it at Brighton in 2012 to seek to increase the margin of 
appreciation member states enjoy.
33
 (In the result, the Preamble of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) will be amended by Protocol No. 15 to the ECHR to add 
references to the principle of subsidiarity and to the margin of appreciation.) The full ‘mirror’ 
approach was also quite recently supported by Sales LJ who argued that rule of law principles 
                                                          
30
 [2007] UKHL 26; [2008] AC 153, [106]; Baroness Hale agreed, [90]. 
31
 Baroness Hale ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’ 12(1) HRLR (2012) 
65, 72. 
32
 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Quark Fishing Ltd [2005] UKHL 57; 
[2006] 1 AC 529, [34]. 
33
 M. Elliott, ‘After Brighton: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ [2012] PL 619, 621. 
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of certainty and predictability support its acceptance,
34
 but his position could be questioned 
on the basis that the Strasbourg jurisprudence is not always of high enough quality to satisfy 
such principles, or on the ground that it is declaratory rather than precedential.
35
  
The full ‘mirror’ approach, however, began to give way, after the HRA had been in 
force for around 7 years, to what might be termed the ‘partial’ or ‘semi-mirror’ approach, 
under which attempts to reflect Strasbourg authority in domestic law are abandoned in the 
face of perceived deficiencies in the potentially applicable European jurisprudence. Thus in 
2007 Lord Bingham found that Strasbourg had not determined a case closely comparable 
with the one before the court, and that it would be inappropriate to align that case with the 
least dissimilar of the Strasbourg cases; instead he said that the task of the court was to seek 
to give fair effect to Strasbourg principles.
36
  In a similar vein in 2008 Lord Hope found that 
the words of the Ullah principle were ‘certainly no less’ but not ‘certainly no more’, and that 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence was not to be treated as a straitjacket.
37
 Adhering to this semi-
mirror model are those who consider that the domestic courts’ judgments should (or could) 
sometimes outpace Strasbourg, but if Strasbourg has spoken, they should normally follow 
suit; departure should be infrequent but is both possible and legitimate. This median approach 
permits a greater degree of judicial discretion in the application of the Strasbourg case-law, 
arguably allowing the courts to search for solutions to rights’ questions which cannot be 
                                                          
34
 P. Sales ‘Strasbourg jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: a response to Lord Irvine’ [2012] PL 253. 
35
 See: R. Masterman, ‘Taking the Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a “Municipal Law of 
Human Rights” under the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 907, 915-917; R. Masterman, ‘Deconstructing 
the Mirror Principle’ in R. Masterman and I. Leigh (eds), The United Kingdom’s Statutory Bill of Rights: 
Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (183 Proceedings of the British Academy) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp.124-129.   
36
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45; [2008] AC 385, [19]. 
37
 In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] AC 173, [50]. 
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answered solely by reference to the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
38
 Again, senior judges have 
indicated their sympathy with this approach in practice
39
 and in academic contributions.
40
  In 
particular, in Re G, the House of Lords (by a majority) determined that an outcome not 
strictly supported by existing Convention jurisprudence could be arrived at if it were ‘likely’ 
that the Strasbourg court would now come to the same result.
41
  More recently, Lord Brown 
found in 2012 that it would be absurd to wait for Strasbourg to make a decision almost 
directly in point before finding a violation, and also that the domestic court could carry its 
law a step further than Strasbourg if so doing would follow naturally from Strasbourg 
principles.
42
 While in 2014 Lord Kerr suggested that the duty of the court under s.6 HRA not 
to act incompatibly with a Convention right requires it to determine whether an alleged right 
exists even where the Strasbourg jurisprudence does not clearly establish its existence.
43
  
                                                          
38
 Cf. N v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 31; [2005] 2 AC 296, [25] (Lord Hope).   
39
 Ambrose v Harris [2011] UKSC 43; [2011] 1 WLR 2435 (Lord Kerr); In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) 
[2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 173, [116]-[123] (Baroness Hale).  
40
 Baroness Hale, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’ (2012) 12(1) HRLR 
65. 
41
 In re G (Adoption: Unmarried Couple) [2008] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 173, [27], [53], [125], and [143].   
42
 Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] UKSC 2; [2012] 2 AC 72, [112]. 
43
 Surrey County Council v P [2014] UKSC 19; [2014] AC 896, [86]. See also: [62]. In R (Keyu and others) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another [2015] UKSC 69; [2016] AC 1355, [98] 
Lord Neuberger considered the possibility of determining what the Strasbourg would have found in the 
circumstances and applying it under the HRA but left the question open in the particular context; he said: ‘I 
would leave open the question whether, if the Strasbourg court would have held that the appellants were entitled 
to seek an investigation into the killings under article 2, a UK court would have been bound to order an inquiry 
pursuant to the 1998 Act’. 
 12 
This approach was reaffirmed as correct recently by Lord Wilson in the minority in 
the Supreme Court in Moohan.
44
 Lord Hodge, in the majority, affirmed the partial mirror 
principle to the effect that if Strasbourg has spoken clearly, its decisions should be followed: 
‘it is consistent with the intention of Parliament in enacting HRA 1998 that our courts should 
follow a clear and constant line of decisions’ of the Strasbourg Court, ‘whose effect is not 
inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose 
reasoning does not appear to overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of 
principle’.45 Given that the majority in Moohan considered that the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
was clear on the issue at hand, they did not need to decide whether Strasbourg should be 
outpaced domestically: Strasbourg had clearly indicated, they found, that Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 did not apply to prisoners voting in a referendum, as opposed to an election 
(bearing in mind the inability of the Scottish Parliament to legislate contrary to the ECHR), 
so they did not need to consider whether they themselves – regardless of the Strasbourg 
stance – could discover a Convention right to vote in such circumstances. Since Lord Wilson 
considered that the jurisprudence was unclear, he went on to consider whether the Ullah 
principle would disable the court ‘from going significantly further than the ECtHR’ by 
determining that Article 3 did extend to voting in the Scottish referendum. He reviewed the 
s.2 jurisprudence under the heading ‘the retreat from the Ullah principle’,46 and found that 
‘where there is no directly relevant decision of the Court with which it would be possible to 
keep pace we can and must do more. We must determine for ourselves the existence or 
                                                          
44
 Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67; [2015] AC 901, [105], [106]. 
45
 Ibid, [13] (citing Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 AC 104, [48]). That 
approach was reaffirmed in R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63; [2014] AC 271, [26] 
and by Baroness Hale in R (Keyu and others) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and 
another [2016] UKSC 69; [2016] AC 1355, [291]. 
46
 Ibid., [103]. 
 13 
otherwise of an alleged Convention right’.47 He then proceeded to find that Article 3 (in its 
domestic conception) did provide a right to vote in referendums, which had been violated in 
the instant case. Supporters of this approach to s.2 have included the original architect of the 
HRA, Lord Irvine,
48
 Lord Hoffmann
49
 and a number of academics writing on the subject.
50
 It 
appears then that the ‘take into account only’, semi-mirror principle, approach is gaining 
ground over the previous full mirror principle approach.  
 
Existing exceptions under the ‘semi-mirror’ principle 
This principle accepts then that the domestic courts can go beyond Strasbourg but in general 
cannot depart from the Court’s decisions where it has spoken clearly on an issue.  However, 
even that aspect of the principle has been found to admit of some exceptions. While Lewis 
was able to comment in 2007 that the judicial compulsion towards following the Strasbourg 
case law was ‘practically inescapable’ – and that exceptions to the presumption that relevant 
Convention jurisprudence be applied were more readily found in theory than in practice
51
 – 
the courts’ approach to s.2(1) in the intervening years has steadily been modified in order to 
more readily reflect that discretion apparent in the wording of s.2(1) of the Act. As the 
grounds on which departure from the nominally-applicable Strasbourg case law become more 
                                                          
47
 Ibid., [105].  
48
 Lord Irvine, ‘A British Interpretation of Convention Rights’ [2012] PL 237. 
49
 See: Lord Hoffmann’s Judicial Studies lecture, 19 March 2009 (available at: 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Uni
versality_of_Human_Rights.pdf).  
50
 See in particular F. Klug and H. Wildbore ‘Follow or lead? The Human Rights Act and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ [2010] EHRLR 621. 
51
 J. Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Rights’ [2007] PL 720, 731.   
 14 
fully articulated by the courts, s.2(1) has become more readily described as a ‘filter into the 
channel by which the Convention rights enter municipal law.’52 
The Supreme Court decision in Pinnock provides, in summary, clear evidence of this 
more nuanced approach. In that decision, Lord Neuberger, with whom the eight other 
Supreme Court Justices agreed, said:  
 
This court is not bound to follow every decision of the European Court. Not only 
would it be impractical to do so: it would sometimes be inappropriate, as it would 
destroy the ability of the court to engage in the constructive dialogue with the 
European court which is of value to the development of Convention law … Of course, 
we should usually follow a clear and constant line of decisions by the European Court 
… but we are not actually bound to do so or (in theory, at least) to follow a decision 
of the Grand Chamber … section 2 of the HRA requires our courts to ‘take into 
account’ European Court decisions, not necessarily to follow them.53 
 
Although the Ullah approach retains some credibility, it can no longer be said to imply an 
unquestioning acceptance of the Strasbourg line, even where that line is clear. The steady 
dilution of the ‘mirror principle’ in recent years has seen the grounds on which domestic 
courts might depart from the Strasbourg line articulated with more confidence and clarity. In 
                                                          
52
 D. Feldman, ‘The Internationalization of Public Law and its Impact on the UK’ in J. Jowell and D. Oliver 
(eds), The Changing Constitution (7
th
 ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.150 (emphasis added).  
53
 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45; [2011] 2 AC 104, [48]. Similarly, In re McCaughey 
and another (Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and others intervening) [2011] UKSC 20; [2012] 1 
AC 725, [93] Baroness Hale said ‘of course, we are not obliged to follow that jurisprudence if there are good 
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Gentle, the House of Lords suggested that departure from the Strasbourg case-law would be 
legitimate where it is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ that the European Court of Human Rights 
would come to a different conclusion than that suggested by the available authorities.
54
  In Re 
G the Law Lords found that, where a margin of appreciation would be likely to be afforded 
by the Strasbourg Court, the question should be regarded as being for domestic authorities to 
‘decide for themselves’.55 The Supreme Court has also indicated that departure from 
Strasbourg might be appropriate if the dispute is governed by common law and the court is 
minded to exercise its discretion to depart from the Strasbourg line,
56
 or if the Strasbourg 
case-law is outdated,
57
 wrong (‘inconsistent with some fundamental substantive or procedural 
aspect of our law’),58 or badly-informed (‘appear[s] to overlook or misunderstand some 
argument or point of principle’).59  
This trend is evident in a number of other decisions: in Animal Defenders 
International the House of Lords determined that it was open to the court to attach ‘great 
weight’ to a parliamentary (legislative) decision which had determined the balance to be 
struck between rights and interests in a way which might be interpreted as being inconsistent 
with Strasbourg authority.
60
 And, as is now well-known, in R v Horncastle,
61
 in the context of 
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Article 6, the Supreme Court considered that departure even from clear Strasbourg 
jurisprudence was exceptionally acceptable under s.2 HRA. The Supreme Court decided that 
the European Court’s prior decision (Al-Khawaja)62 insufficiently appreciated particular 
aspects of the domestic process, and determined that in those circumstances it could decline 
to follow the Strasbourg lead. The domestic provisions in question, the Court found, struck 
the right balance between the imperative that a trial must be fair and the interests of victims 
in particular and society in general. The Strasbourg test, it found, did not strike the right 
balance since it gave a higher value to Article 6 standards than those provisions did, and 
therefore it was not applied.
63
  
 
THE CONSERVATIVE PROJECT UNDER A NEW ‘SECTION 2(1)’  
Conservative opposition to the impact of s.2(1) HRA 
Conservative opposition to the HRA centres, as mentioned above, on criticism of a number of 
Strasbourg decisions, especially certain ones against the UK.
64
 That opposition can clearly 
find only partial expression by seeking to break the link between the courts and Strasbourg,
65
 
and even that stance focuses on Ullah-style approaches to s.2(1) which, as discussed, are in 
the process of being discarded. The reason expressed in the 2014 Conservative document for 
introducing the BBoR and repealing the HRA is that ‘over the past 20 years, there have been 
significant developments which have undermined public confidence in the human rights 
framework in the UK.’ It finds that the European Court of Human Rights has developed 
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‘mission creep’ on the basis that Strasbourg adopts ‘a principle of interpretation that regards 
the Convention as a living instrument’.66 The problem, from this anti-HRA viewpoint, is 
partly that the interpretations of the Convention rights at Strasbourg on a number of 
contentious issues – in particular prisoners’ voting rights, aspects of counter-terrorism law 
and deportation of non-citizens – are ones that are not assented to by the Westminster 
Parliament, or in some instances by judges in the House of Lords/Supreme Court,
67
 but which 
may have effect in UK law
68
 or constrain Parliament.
69
  
Although the ‘living instrument’ approach was well-established in the jurisprudence 
of the Court at the point at which Parliament passed the HRA,
70
 the interpretative approach 
has been criticised for giving rise to unpredictability, and for exacerbating the effects of the 
Convention rights, when creative decisions have an unexpected effect in areas of domestic 
law. In 2009 Dominic Grieve (the then Attorney-General) said that the equivalent of s.2 HRA 
in a new BBoR should allow or require the domestic courts to take a different stance from 
Strasbourg in a wider range of circumstances than those then accepted. Grieve argued that the 
HRA had been ‘interpreted as requiring a degree of deference to Strasbourg that I believe was 
and should be neither required nor intended’.71  According to Grieve – and now reflected in 
the 2014 Conservative document – s.2 should be radically amended since (combined with 
                                                          
66
 The Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws (October 2014), p.3. 
67
 See the speeches in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 
269, especially that of Lord Hoffmann. 
68
 See for example the then Home Secretary’s (Theresa May) speech to the Conservative Party Conference on 4 
October 2011 on this point.  
69
 See HC Debates, Vol.551, Cols. 922-923, 24 October 2012 (David Cameron MP).  
70
 See: Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 1.   
71
 ‘British Bill of Rights Review Imminent, says David Cameron’, The Guardian, 16 February 2011.   
 18 
ss.3 and 6) it has gone far too far in allowing Strasbourg decisions to re-shape domestic law.
72
  
Conservative nominee Martin Howe, in his individual paper appended to the Report of the 
Bill of Rights Commission, took a similar view, arguing that domestic courts should not 
‘slavishly follow every twist and turn of the doctrines formulated in the decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court’.73 
From this viewpoint the effects of ss.2 and 3 HRA combined, or of ss.2 and 6, are part 
of the problem since s.2 can operate in conjunction with ss.3 or 6 to allow a Strasbourg 
decision, that happens to bear on a matter currently in front of a domestic court, to have legal 
effect in domestic law, before the executive has had a chance to react to the decision. The 
executive might well prefer to delay and procrastinate, or to bring forward legislation to 
Parliament which might represent a more minimal response to the Strasbourg decision than 
the court-based findings might do. In AF (No.3)
74
 – for instance – s.2 was taken to require 
immediate acceptance into law of the A v UK minimum disclosure principle.
75
 AF then had 
the result – unwelcome to the executive in terms of its general implications – of affecting the 
use of the counter-terror control orders system. Hence the Conservative plan reflected in the 
2014 document, and expressed in the 2015 Manifesto, that the s.2 ‘link’ should be broken 
between the Strasbourg and domestic courts, and ‘the European Court of Human Rights 
[should] no longer be binding over the UK Supreme Court’.  
 
Methods of ‘breaking the link’ in a British Bill of Rights 
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But the method of ‘breaking the link’ is clearly problematic since s.2 HRA on a literal 
reading requires judges only to take account of Strasbourg rulings, not to give effect to them. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill, introduced in 2012 by 
Conservative MP Charlie Elphicke,
76
 was withdrawn before its second reading. But it can be 
taken as affording indications as to the nature of forthcoming Conservative proposals for the 
BBoR as to a new s.2.
77
 Its clause 2 provides that a court or tribunal determining a question 
which has arisen in connection with a protected right ‘may’, not ‘must’, ‘take into account a 
judgment of the ECtHR and/or
 
a judgment of a court in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
United States of America or any country having a common law-based judicial system, of the 
European Court of Human Rights; or a court in any other jurisdiction which may be relevant 
to the UK right under consideration’.  
In order to weaken the linkages between domestic decisions and those of the 
Strasbourg Court under a BBoR – taking account of the Elphicke Bill, the 2014 document, 
and assuming continued membership of the ECHR system – the instrument might seek to 
specify the grounds on which the Strasbourg jurisprudence should not be followed. The 
obvious grounds on which departure from the jurisprudence might be sanctioned have, to 
varying degrees (as regards grounds 1-8 below), already been acknowledged in the 
developing jurisprudence under the HRA discussed, and include the following:     
 
1. No relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence can be identified.  
2. Relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is not ‘clear’. 
3. Relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is not ‘constant’. 
                                                          
76
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4. Relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is ‘out-dated’. 
5. Relevant clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence is inconsistent with a domestic 
precedent binding the court in question.  
6. Relevant clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence against the UK failed to 
understand a point of domestic law.  
7. Relevant clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence against the UK failed to take 
account of factual matters.  
8. Relevant clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence against the UK failed to take 
account of an established [or developing] principle of domestic law. 
9. Relevant clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence against the UK (or another 
member state) conflicts with jurisprudence from other similar national Supreme Courts. 
10. Relevant clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence which appears to conflict with 
Parliament’s legislative intention should be disregarded. 
 
Although a list of permitted exceptions would be both unwieldy and – ironically – limiting of 
domestic judicial discretion, a BBoR could provide that if one or more of these conditions 
applied, the Strasbourg decision should not be applied in the instant case.  Conditions 1-4 are 
uncontroversial, since they have already received some acceptance, as discussed, from the 
judiciary under s.2 HRA, although condition 4 would also require that the words ‘whenever 
made or given’ in s.2(1) HRA, would have to be omitted.  Condition 5 is already provided for 
in the House of Lords decision in Kay v Lambeth LBC.
78
 Conditions 6-7 have also already 
received judicial acceptance under s.2 HRA; they also echo the message to be found in the 
Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Casadevall et al in the recent Grand Chamber decision in 
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Jaloud v the Netherlands.
79
 The courts have come fairly close to the position captured in 
Condition 8, as discussed above in relation to exceptions to the semi-mirror principle under 
s.2 HRA. Conditions 9 and 10 would obviously depart from the courts’ recent acceptance of 
the semi-mirror principle discussed, and would require elaboration. Condition 9 would 
require that conflicting jurisprudence from other similar national Supreme Courts would be 
treated, if in conflict with Strasbourg, as of more significance in interpreting the BBoR rights 
than Strasbourg jurisprudence. Otherwise it could be treated as of similar significance. Those 
two conditions are not necessarily inconsistent with Article 46 ECHR since the state would 
remain bound to address the case-law in question, if against the UK, and if it represented the 
‘final’ decision.   
The anti-mirror principle could also be captured in a BBoR in relation to development 
of domestic law, aside from any exceptions under the new ‘s.2’. A form of words could be 
used that echoes s.11 HRA, providing that recourse to common law recognition of rights 
should occur, even where arguably a Convention right was relevant to the dispute. As Lord 
Mance said in Kennedy: ‘the natural starting point in any dispute is to start with domestic 
law, and it is certainly not to focus exclusively on the Convention rights without surveying 
the wider common law scene.’80 A new ‘s.11’ could further provide that if the relevant 
common law right could be developed to cover the dispute in question recourse to the ECHR 
jurisprudence could be deemed unnecessary. That would accord with conditions 7 and 9 
above; this possibility is considered further below.  
 
Consequences of ‘breaking the link’ through repeal of the HRA 
Protection for rights under the British Bill of Rights 
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The attempt to diminish the domestic impact of the Strasbourg jurisprudence is not – at first 
glance – reflected in the 2014 Conservative proposals as to the list of rights to appear in the 
BBoR; it is to ‘[p]ut the text of the original Human Rights Convention into primary 
legislation.’ The document proceeds: ‘[t]here is nothing wrong with that original document, 
which contains a sensible mix of checks and balances alongside the rights it sets out, and is a 
laudable statement of the principles for a modern democratic nation. We will not introduce 
new basic rights through this reform; our aim is to restore common sense, and to tackle the 
misuse of the rights contained in the Convention’. So it appears that the aim of seeking to 
weaken the ties to Strasbourg via a BBoR is not to be realised via changes to the core listed 
rights (a position also reflected in the Bill of Rights Commission’s terms of reference).  
However, an activist approach to the rights listed in the BBoR might be stifled by the 
inclusion of limitation clauses. The 2014 Conservative document proposes to (emphasis 
added): 
 
Clarify the Convention rights, to reflect a proper balance between rights and 
responsibilities. This will ensure that they are applied in accordance with the original 
intentions for the Convention and the mainstream understanding of these rights. We 
will set out a clearer test in how some of the inalienable rights apply to cases of 
deportation and other removal of persons from the United Kingdom. […] The 
Convention recognises that people have civic responsibilities, and allows some of its 
rights to be restricted to uphold the rights and interests of other people. Our new Bill 
will clarify these limitations on individual rights in certain circumstances. 
 
This appears to imply that the link between Strasbourg and the domestic courts would be 
further weakened due to express provisions in the text of the BBoR other than the wording of 
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a new ‘s.2’, taking the form of limitation, ‘interpretation’ or re-balancing clauses which could 
create exceptions going beyond those expressly present in the ECHR. Such provisions, it 
appears, could affect equivalents of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, and would be likely to apply to 
equivalents of Articles 5 and 6. Articles 8-11 ECHR already contain exceptions based on a 
broad range of societal interests if the interference is necessary and proportionate, but the 
proposal would include creating broader exceptions to the BBoR version of Article 8 (as has 
occurred already in the Immigration Act 2014),
81
 or provision to disapply it in the 
circumstances envisaged. A domestic court would have to decide on the precise meaning of 
an ‘interpretation’ clause in the BBoR in relation to the facts of a case before it, before it 
could determine whether or not it could take account of the Strasbourg jurisprudence in the 
affected area. Change to the s.2 equivalent in the BBoR would also have an impact on a new 
‘s3’. If s.2 HRA appeared in radically changed form in a new BBoR, the judges would still 
have to interpret provisions of statutes in relation to the listed rights in the BBoR, but without 
a guide from the Strasbourg jurisprudence might, in the more sensitive areas of executive 
action, do so in ways that failed fully to call the executive to account, as discussed further 
below. 
  The inclusion of limitation clauses would obviously be most controversial in respect 
of the non-materially qualified rights which appear likely to be expressed in language in the 
BBoR similar to that used in the ECHR. Under the Strasbourg jurisprudence the scope for 
placing limitations on the Article 6(1) standards to be applied is very limited: leaving a 
derogation aside, it can occur only on a ‘strictly necessary’ basis where national security 
demands it (or certain other pressing interests) so long as the hearing overall is fair.
82
 Very 
limited departures from full adherence to certain aspects of a fair hearing, including full 
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disclosure of the material on which suspicion is based, or equality of arms, may be 
permissible, provided that these are strictly necessary to protect other vital interests, such as 
the safety of witnesses or national security.
83
  
Article 5, however, does not allow for deprivations of liberty outside the permitted 
exceptions, even for the most pressing national security reasons, without a derogation.  But a 
re-balancing clause in a new BBoR could enable an overt limitation of the ambit of an Article 
5(1) equivalent to be created, meaning, for example, that liberty-invading executive measures 
on the control orders model (strengthened TPIMs under the Counter-terrorism Act 2015 Part 
Two or enhanced TPIMs
84– as the replacement preventive measure for control orders) could 
be used with less concern that a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 might be found to arise.  
A re-balancing clause might appear to be of value in the sense of offering the government 
greater freedom of action to introduce or continue executive measures of detention in relation 
to terrorist suspects who cannot be deported or – it is claimed – prosecuted. But obviously 
challenges at Strasbourg would then arise. 
Most controversially, the ability of the judiciary to reflect expansive Strasbourg 
interpretations of the rights listed in the BBoR could also be stifled by rendering Strasbourg 
decisions advisory only in terms of binding the state. The 2014 Conservative plan proposed 
that ‘every judgement that UK law is incompatible with the Convention will be treated as 
advisory and we will introduce a new Parliamentary procedure to formally consider the 
judgement. It will only be binding in UK law if Parliament agrees that it should be enacted as 
                                                          
83
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such’.85 Most obviously, decisions relating to prisoners’ voting rights,86 deportation of 
foreign criminals,
87
 and sex offenders
88
 would be likely prompts for such a step. If that aspect 
of the proposals was taken forward in a BBoR, then it would presumably also have an impact 
on the judges’ stance under the new ‘s.2’, since they would probably be reluctant to absorb a 
Strasbourg decision against the UK into domestic law via the BBoR if that decision was one 
that Parliament had decided not to adhere to. In any event, the new ‘s.2’ would be likely to 
direct the judges not to take account even of settled Strasbourg jurisprudence that 
contradicted the intentions of Parliament.  
Obviously that aspect of the plan would run contrary Article 46 ECHR, which 
provides that states agree to adhere to final judgments against themselves. Under the 
Conservative proposals, Parliament would have the key responsibility for protecting the 
ECHR rights.  However, the document does not explain how the aim of treating the 
Strasbourg Court as an advisory body only, allowing open defiance of Strasbourg decisions in 
legislation, could be reconciled with Article 46 or with the UK’s continued adherence to the 
ECHR; it is also highly unlikely that any negotiation via the Council of Europe could allow 
for such a change.
89
 This aspect of the proposals appears – if seriously pursued – to represent 
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the first steps on the way to withdrawal from the Convention. Theresa May openly canvassed 
for withdrawal from the Convention in the run-up to the ‘Brexit’ referendum,90 and – even 
though she subsequently indicated that such a step would not command widespread support 
and would accordingly not be pursued – reports have continued to speculate that taking the 
UK out of the Convention system remains a mid-term (post-Brexit) objective.
91
  
 
Reconciling enhanced flexibility with the benefits of Strasbourg oversight 
Re-evaluation of the linkage between domestic courts and the European Court of Human 
Rights provides an opportunity to consider the implications of introducing a BBoR, partly or 
mainly to escape from the unpredictable impact of the Strasbourg ‘living instrument’ 
approach. As discussed, the new ‘s.2’ would be likely to indicate that the courts could take 
account of domestic constitutional values, and possibly decisions of other Supreme Courts, 
according such sources a weight at least equal to that of Strasbourg decisions. That would 
appear to mean that the Supreme Court would be enabled in the BBoR to go beyond 
Strasbourg – as it has recently accepted that it is able to do under s.2 HRA.92 As discussed 
above, domestic judges have already found that their determinations as to the scope of rights 
need not be curtailed by the particular point that Strasbourg has reached, or by the operation 
of the margin of appreciation doctrine; rather, in a number of instances the judges have struck 
out on their own in a determination to create expansive interpretations of Convention rights, 
creating rights in areas not clearly apparent in the ECHR jurisprudence, and in the process 
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creating a more domestically-attuned, creative and imaginative domestic human rights’ 
jurisprudence.  
So it would appear to be the case that if, for example, the new BBoR ‘s.2’ enjoined 
the judges not to accord the Strasbourg jurisprudence any higher status than domestic 
constitutional principles, a more creative and expansive rights-based jurisprudence could 
arise under the BBoR. But possibly such creativity in practice would be likely to arise only in 
the less politically difficult areas of human rights law, judging by the record of the judges 
under the HRA. For example, in the cases of Re G
93
 and of Campbell
94
 the House of Lords 
gave a more expansive interpretation to Article 8 than Strasbourg at the point in question had 
done. Campbell found that Article 8 ECHR applied via the courts’ obligation under s.6 HRA 
in adjudicating on an existing common law action in relation to a private body, a newspaper, 
which had invaded the privacy of Naomi Campbell (indirect horizontal effect). Such a finding 
was not supported explicitly by Strasbourg jurisprudence at that point in time.
95
 Re G 
concerned the question whether an unmarried couple should be subjected to an absolute bar 
to adoption in favour of married couples. The House of Lords found that the ban created 
discrimination on grounds of marital status in relation to Article 8, even though no Strasbourg 
decision had clearly established that marital status was a protected ground of discrimination 
under Article 14. Somewhat similarly, in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust
96
 the Supreme 
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Court found unanimously that the state owes an operational duty under Article 2 ECHR to a 
hospital patient who is mentally ill but who is not formally detained under the Mental Health 
Act. That stance was taken even though the Strasbourg jurisprudence did not demonstrate 
clearly that such a duty existed.  
In R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, which concerned the 
politically sensitive matter of asylum-seeking,
97
 the court found that the ‘only approximately 
relevant authority’98 at the Strasbourg level was the admissibility decision in O’Rourke v 
United Kingdom.
99
 The treatment, by the European Court of Human Rights, of the relevant 
law in O’Rourke runs to a mere four paragraphs; yet on the basis of that slight authority the 
House of Lords was able not only to fashion a remedy, but to extend the scope of the 
protection arguably offered by Article 3 of the Convention in the domestic context in so 
doing.
100
 The same can be said of EM (Lebanon)
101
 which was viewed as so controversial that 
its effects were reined in via legislation (at least, that is one of the intentions underlying the 
Immigration Act 2014 s.19).  
But in the even more sensitive areas of national security and crime control the 
domestic judges have been ‘corrected’ at Strasbourg in the HRA era,102 which supports the 
argument that the judges should remain anchored to Strasbourg via s.2, and the semi-mirror 
principle, because on the whole Strasbourg shows a greater determination to uphold human 
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rights standards against legislative and executive encroachment. Thus Gillan v UK
103
 
departed from the very restrained interpretation of Article 8 adopted domestically in R (on the 
application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis.
104
 A v UK
105
 upheld a 
higher due process standard than the previous House of Lords’ decision in Secretary of State 
for the Home Department v MB
106
 had done in relation to Article 6. As mentioned, A v UK 
was then absorbed directly into domestic law via ss.2 and 3 HRA in AF (No.3).
107
 In R (S) v 
Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police and R (Marper) v Chief Constable of the South 
Yorkshire Police
108
 the claimants sought judicial review of the retention by the police of their 
fingerprints and DNA samples on the grounds inter alia that the practice was incompatible 
with Article 8 ECHR. The majority of the House of Lords held that the retention constituted 
an interference with the claimants’ Article 8 rights, but they unanimously held that any 
interference was justified under Article 8(2). The European Court of Human Rights disagreed 
in S and Marper v United Kingdom.
109
 Similarly, the Strasbourg judgment in the Qatada case 
(Othman v UK)
110
 departed from the House of Lords’ findings111 in that instance as regards 
Article 6 (but agreed with the Court of Appeal ones),
112
 taking a more expansive view of the 
Article 6 requirements.  
                                                          
103
 (2010) 50 EHRR 45. 
104
 [2006] UKHL 12; [2006] 2 AC 307. 
105
 (2009) 49 EHRR 29. 
106
  [2007] UKHL 46; [2008] 1 AC 440. 
107
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 269.  
108
 [2004] UKHL 39; [2004] 1 WLR 2196. 
109
  (2008) 48 EHRR 1169. 
110
 (2012) 55 EHRR 1. 
111
 Othman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10; [2010] 2 AC 110, in which it was 
found that Qatada could be deported. 
112
 Othman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 290; [2008] 3 WLR 798. 
 30 
Clearly, whatever the Conservative leadership meant by ‘breaking the link’ to 
Strasbourg, it did not mean that the full mirror principle should be captured in the BBoR 
‘s.2’, but, ironically, if the BBoR is not intended by the Conservative leadership to foster a 
more expansive and creative domestic human rights’ jurisprudence, which appears to be the 
case, it could be argued that the BBoR should strengthen, not weaken, the link to Strasbourg. 
Certain of the decisions considered, such as Campbell and EM (Lebanon), might support that 
conclusion. In other words, from the Conservative perspective, a new ‘s.2’ should be used to 
rein in the Supreme Court rather than Strasbourg, by tying it more firmly to certain less 
creative and expansive aspects of the Strasbourg jurisprudence. On the other hand, the 
Strasbourg decisions in the area of national security, ‘correcting’ the national courts, would 
obviously suggest that government would be less likely to be called to account in that area, 
and might acquire greater freedom of action, at least until a challenge at Strasbourg, if the 
Supreme Court had greater leeway under ‘s.2’ to disregard the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
These two opposing possible consequences of ‘breaking the link’ with Strasbourg are thrown 
into starker relief and pursued further in the next section, which considers complete 
decoupling of the domestic courts from Strasbourg.    
 
Full de-coupling of domestic courts from Strasbourg? 
De-coupling of the courts from Strasbourg could be taken to mean adhering in ‘s.2’ BBoR to 
a version of the anti-mirror principle to the effect that the courts could refuse to follow 
Strasbourg, even where clear and constant jurisprudence was apparent, where the Supreme 
Court disagreed with that jurisprudence. But a ruling of the Supreme Court clearly or 
probably contrary to clear and constant Strasbourg jurisprudence might well lead to a 
successful application to Strasbourg, which would mean that the BBoR had failed to allow 
rights to be vindicated domestically.  That would mean that delay would be incurred while an 
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application proceeded to Strasbourg, leaving domestic human rights’ breaches to subsist for 
significant periods. The eventual Strasbourg ruling could be reacted to by the executive and 
/or Parliament, depending on any provision in the BBoR providing for that eventuality, which 
in particular might address the question whether the status of the judgment could be 
diminished.  
However, such de-coupling could also be deemed to be advantageous in terms of 
rights-protection at the present time, although that is obviously not likely to form part of the 
future Conservative defence of the new ‘s.2’. Such a proposition might appear counter-
intuitive at first glance, especially taking account of the jurisprudence in the area of national 
security considered above. The Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence has been in effect world-
leading and has quite dramatically enhanced rights’ protection in a range of contexts in the 
UK.
113
 The influence of its previous jurisprudence at the international level and via the HRA 
has already embedded itself in judicial rights-based thinking and will certainly in that sense 
influence decisions under the BBoR. But it is arguable that the European Court has recently 
shown a tendency, perhaps in anticipation of what was likely to occur at the Brighton High 
Level conference in 2012, and what might occur in future, to seek to appease member states, 
and the UK in particular, by handing down less confrontational judgments.
114
 The Coalition 
Government, as mentioned above, attempted to rein in the Court, no doubt partly as a result 
of the A v UK and Qatada judgments, at the Brighton Conference in 2012,
115
 although the 
                                                          
113
 In addition to those ‘corrective’ decisions mentioned above, see also: Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 2 
EHRR 1; Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 2 EHRR 25; Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-1980) 2 
EHRR 245; Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149. 
114
 Eg Babar Ahmed and others v United Kingdom (2402/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66811/09 and 67354/09) and 
also refusal (25
 
September 2012) of leave to appeal to Grand Chamber.  
115
 See The Brighton Declaration (2012), available at:  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf.  
 32 
declaration that actually emerged, originally intended by David Cameron to create strongly 
enhanced subsidiarity, was not on the whole radical.
116
   
Redolent of a somewhat more appeasement-oriented approach, it appears that, 
currently the ‘living instrument’ approach of the Strasbourg Court is coming under pressure, 
especially in the counter-terror context, as states attempt to address violent manifestations of 
Wahabism/Salafism
117
 and seek to head off responses from the extreme right to such 
manifestations.  In the more sensitive areas of rights’ interpretation Strasbourg is currently 
showing a tendency to abandon the ‘living instrument’ approach.118 And attempts to mollify 
intense criticisms of the Strasbourg regime in the UK are arguably visible in the recent 
decisions not to award compensation to prisoners deprived of voting rights
119
 and the Grand 
Chamber finding that whole life sentences are Article 3 compliant.
120
 With a view to its own 
future, and to the project of maintaining a degree of rights’ protection, in a range of arenas, 
the European Court may therefore be relying on a notion of enhanced subsidiarity, placing 
stronger emphasis on the margin of appreciation doctrine, heavily influenced by the 
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‘European common standards’ approach,121 as appeasement devices to obscure the possibility 
that in some contexts it is preserving only a minimum rights’ standards.   
The Court is also currently attempting to maintain its own authority, which is coming 
increasingly under threat as certain states appear to be repudiating ‘Western’ human rights’ 
standards.
122
 In seeking to do so the Court has increasingly turned to relying on discerning a 
common European standard; if no such standard can be discerned, or if such a standard is 
only nascent, it will accord a wide margin of appreciation to the member state in question. 
The result is a tendency to avoid confrontations with member states on sensitive and 
culturally-specific issues.
123
 This tendency is evident in the social context where there are 
very clear divergences of view in the member states, especially as to homosexual rights. 
Partly as a result of its ‘common European consensus’ approach, certain decisions at 
Strasbourg as to protection for same sex unions under Article 8 exemplify this tendency 
towards appeasement, in particular the decision in Oliari v Italy,
124
 in which the Court 
declared the claim to a right to same sex marriage to be inadmissible. While Oliari did 
recognise a right to a same sex registered partnership under Article 8, its recognition was 
hedged around with various conditions which would be unlikely to be fulfilled in a number of 
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Central or Eastern European countries, possibly for many years.
125
 The Court took account in 
relation to Italy of discordance between social reality and the law, and the coherence of the 
administrative and legal practices within the domestic system, in assessing the applicable 
positive obligations. Such a discordance would be unlikely to be discerned in, for example, 
Turkey, Slovakia or Russia, where it would be much harder for a same sex partnership to live 
openly as a couple, and where a much higher percentage of the population are opposed to 
recognition of same sex unions than in Italy. It appeared that the Court was seeking to 
preserve the very fragile consensus across Europe that exists in relation to the ECHR.  Oliari 
and the decision in Schalk and Kopf v Austria
126
 could be compared in this respect with 
acceptance of same sex marriage in Obergefell v Hodges
127
 in the US Supreme Court, or with 
Von Hannover (No.3) which, it is argued, down-graded the significance of privacy
128
 as 
compared to the stance taken in Campbell in the House of Lords.
129
   
It may be argued then that as far as Western democracies are concerned, on a range of 
issues the Court’s stance is no longer that of a leader in ensuring rights’ protection. If the 
Supreme Court was in effect enjoined in a BBoR to become the guardian of the rights 
enshrined in the BBoR, that would appear to accord it the authority and legitimacy the Law 
Lords appeared to seek when they decided in Ullah to anchor themselves to the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. The result might be that the rights-based jurisprudence of the Supreme Court 
was enriched under the BBoR rather than undermined, bearing in mind the influence on the 
jurisprudence of the ‘appeasement devices’ of the Court just mentioned. Thus it is concluded 
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that non-importation of an equivalent to s.2 in the BBoR could cautiously be welcomed. Lord 
Wilson’s stance, for example, in Moohan gives substance to the argument that the Supreme 
Court under a BBoR might continue to be prepared to develop a more creative domestic 
human rights jurisprudence if partially de-coupled from Strasbourg. Further, if the new ‘s.2’ 
more fully decoupled the courts from Strasbourg then, where Strasbourg has spoken in a 
manner that limits the scope of a right, as the majority in Moohan found it had done (clearly) 
in relation to the scope of Article 3, the Supreme Court could decide to disregard that 
limitation and create a more expansive version of the right domestically, as a number of the 
judges in the minority were prepared to consider doing in Moohan.
130
 
However, while de-coupling from Strasbourg might appear to have the potential to 
free the domestic courts to self-generate expansive and comprehensive municipal protections 
for human rights, it should also be observed that so doing would be in tension with much of 
the insular, parochial tenor of Conservative politicians’ statements on human rights.131 Thus, 
clearly, the question would be how far such statements had an influence on the wording of a 
new ‘s.2’ and thereafter on the stance of the Supreme Court under the BBoR.  A new ‘s.2’ in 
the BBoR might not – even if a Conservative-dominated House of Commons passes such an 
instrument – be able to create a strait-jacket precluding activist interpretations of the rights. 
But if unequivocal wording was used, subordinating, as far as the judges were concerned, 
settled jurisprudence at Strasbourg to legislative determinations, a diminution in rights 
protection in the UK would tend to follow. 
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Further, while the UK is found to be in breach of the requirements of the Convention 
relatively infrequently,
132
 a number of the cases referenced above illustrate that the European 
Court of Human Rights continues to play a significant corrective role, highlighting those 
occasions on which the national authorities in the UK have fallen below what it gauges to be 
the required pan-European minimum standard. It should not simply be assumed that domestic 
institutions, liberated from the perceived constraints of the Strasbourg case-law, would 
necessarily produce domesticated alternatives of comparable – or greater – force.  However, 
the force of that objection would depend on the extent to which the more recent 
‘appeasement’-based Strasbourg approach continues to influence decisions, and on the 
willingness of the domestic judges – and the capacity of domestic law – to produce such 
alternatives.
133
 It would be counter-intuitive to suggest that recent evidence of ‘going beyond’ 
Strasbourg, would be retracted if, in considering the scope of a particular instance of rights 
protection, judges did not need to begin by assessing the clarity or otherwise of the relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out that instances 
might arise in the more sensitive areas affected by the ECHR, including police powers and 
national security, as in A v UK in relation to Article 6, in which the corrective role of 
Strasbourg was pivotal. 
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Re-enter the Common Law? 
In parallel with the judicial development of an interpretation of the requirements of s.2(1) 
which admits of greater flexibility in the translation of Strasbourg jurisprudence into 
domestic law, the UK Supreme Court has also pointed towards the further development of a 
distinctly national source of rights protection, reiterating – in a series of recent decisions – the 
potential utility of the common law as a tool of rights protection.
134
  Observing the tendency 
– prompted by the HRA – for courts and advocates to treat the Convention case-law as both 
the beginning and end of an enquiry into a potential infringement of rights, the Supreme 
Court has sought to reaffirm the rights-protecting qualities of the common law. Appealing to 
the doctrine of subsidiarity, the Supreme Court has argued that the HRA did not necessarily 
‘supersede the protection of human rights under the common law or statute, or create a 
discrete body of law based upon judgments of the European court.’135 The domestic law is 
therefore in the process of being re-emphasised as ‘the natural starting point’ for analysis of a 
rights question, with the Supreme Court cautioning against focusing exclusively on the 
Convention rights.
136
 Were this tendency to become more marked after repeal of the HRA, it 
might render any tinkering with the wording of a new ‘s.2’ in a BBoR irrelevant. 
In the face of political antagonism towards the Convention and the European Court of 
Human Rights, the recent judicial embrace of common law principles can be interpreted as an 
attempt to emphasise the existing, and distinctly national, capacity of the courts to uphold 
individual rights. As Lady Hale found in Moohan ‘if we are confronted with a question which 
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has not yet arisen in the European Court [of Human Rights], we have to work out the answer 
for ourselves, taking into account, not only the principles which have been developed in 
Strasbourg, but also the principles of our own law and constitution’.137 However, the potential 
of the common law as a tool of rights’ protection should not be overstated; it is (at the current 
stage of its development) powerless to resist a clear and unequivocal legislative 
encroachment into rights.
138
 It is also notable that its pre-HRA standard of judicial review of 
administrative discretion – even at the ‘anxious scrutiny’ end of the Wednesbury scale – was 
found to be lacking by the European Court.
139
 Although the potential for rights’ questions to 
be resolved by recourse to the common law should not be ignored, nor should the potential 
for the Convention to require adherence to a more exacting standard:  
 
... although the Convention and our domestic law give expression to common values, 
the balance between those values, when they conflict, may not always be struck in the 
same place under the Convention as it might once have been under our domestic law. 
In that event, effect must be given to the Convention rights in accordance with the 
Human Rights Act.
140
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The limitations of the common law in terms of creating rights’ protection were emphasised 
by Lord Hodge in Moohan in finding that there is no common law right of universal and 
equal suffrage that could override the legislative position:  
 
It is not appropriate for the courts to develop the common law in order to supplement 
or override the statutory rules which determine our democratic franchise. In In re 
McKerr,
141
 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated […]: ‘The courts have always been 
slow to develop the common law by entering, or re-entering, a field regulated by 
legislation. Rightly so, because otherwise there would inevitably be the prospect of 
the common law shaping powers and duties and provisions inconsistent with those 
prescribed by Parliament.’142 
 
While the resurgence of common law rights-based reasoning has sought to re-emphasise that 
national law – absent the influence of the Convention jurisprudence – has the ability to offer 
protections for individual rights, the Supreme Court has openly acknowledged that the 
standards of protection offered may very well differ. Nor – as Moohan indicates – should it 
be assumed that the common law would necessarily expand to fill the jurisprudential space 
currently occupied by the Strasbourg case-law as its growth may be inhibited by statute.  
Even if – as Lord Hodge indicated in Moohan – the common law maintains a reserve power 
to declare unlawful primary legislation which ‘abusively’ undermined democracy and the 
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rule of law
143
 – the traditional subordination of judge-made law to statute, lack of a defined 
catalogue of rights, and uncertain remedial capacity, ensures that it lacks the weaponry to 
offer as robust, and comprehensive, a level of protection as that potentially afforded by the 
Strasbourg Court and HRA jurisprudence. Without considerable judicial impetus (which in 
the face of a clear legislative statement would also surely be decried as unwarranted 
activism), it will continue to fail do so for the foreseeable future.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The growing evidence of ‘exceptions’ to the semi-mirror principle reflects the pragmatic 
acceptance that the Strasbourg jurisprudence does not provide determinative authority for 
every arising human rights dispute,
144
 that an uncritical stance towards the European Court’s 
case-law effectively inhibits dialogue initiated by national courts
145
 and it is likely to be 
symptomatic of a judicial response to the political disquiet surrounding the disempowerment 
of national institutions supposedly prompted by the enactment of the HRA.
146
  In the light of 
these domestic jurisprudential developments, political rhetoric concerning the subordination 
of domestic institutions to the Strasbourg court represents a (deliberately?) simplified 
account. Placing instead a stronger emphasis on the ability of domestic judges to depart from 
Strasbourg could aid in maintaining the idea that the HRA was never intended to disturb 
national sovereignty by subjecting domestic institutions to the overwhelming influence of the 
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Strasbourg case-law. It is fairly clear why it is the case that de-emphasising s.2’s current 
ability to place curbs on Parliament’s decisions might appear to neuter Conservative 
objections to the HRA which largely rest on anger at its ability to facilitate European 
interference with such decisions.  
In principle, the introduction of a BBoR – even to supporters of the HRA – could be 
regarded as being unobjectionable. Further, the notion that the domestic judges should not be 
constrained by Strasbourg, evident in Re G and in Moohan, has long held appeal.  But to use 
a BBoR as a method of escaping the impact of the Convention, rather than as a domestic 
means of seeking to ensure that recourse to Strasbourg to vindicate rights is unnecessary, is a 
clearly retrograde step, opposing the notion on the international stage, that the UK’s human 
rights’ record is one that is overall to be respected. 
The proposals may partly amount to political rhetoric, intended to appease various 
elements in the party and avert the UKIP threat. Their precise realisation in practice is clearly 
problematic at present, given the Conservatives’ currently slim majority.  Repeal of the HRA 
and introduction of a BBoR would bring about some change in the relationship between the 
domestic courts and Strasbourg, as discussed, and affect methods of protecting human rights 
in Britain, but they would be unlikely to be of the order of magnitude that the 2015 Manifesto 
and the 2014 document suggest. For example, the Supreme Court could develop and apply a 
principle of proportionality as an aspect of unreasonableness,
147
 regardless of Strasbourg 
interpretations of the ECHR rights.  If the Convention rights were to be captured in the BBoR 
it is unlikely in any event that the Supreme Court could literally disregard Strasbourg 
interpretations of the rights, and previous domestic jurisprudence absorbing those 
interpretations would presumably stand.  
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The domestic judiciary and the Strasbourg Court appear to be moving towards a 
position in which the main Conservative objections to the impact of s.2 are being, to an 
extent, neutered. While the recent enhanced emphasis on subsidiarity at Strasbourg could be 
utilised, as it has been above in exploring – or toying with – this possibility, to support an 
argument for the de-coupling of the domestic courts from Strasbourg, it would, it is argued, 
fail to support that argument if the mirror principle was largely discarded, as advocated in 
Moohan. The partial de-coupling of the domestic courts from Strasbourg that has already 
occurred, combined with the dialogic approach evident in the Horncastle saga, takes much of 
the force from the Conservative argument for espousing a BBoR mainly to escape from an 
over-activist Strasbourg approach.  
Thus, if the Conservative objection is mainly to the ‘living instrument’ approach 
taken by the Court to the ECHR, then, as this article has argued, there are two bases for 
contending that the concern is being over-emphasised.
148
 As discussed, the domestic courts 
appear to be in retreat from Ullah, and appear to be entering a new phase of post-HRA 
domestic reasoning in which the Court’s jurisprudence may provide an aid to guide the 
interpretation of the rights, but not necessarily to perform a more prescriptive role. Further, 
the Strasbourg Court itself appears to be in retreat, to an extent, from its living instrument 
approach: its most creative phase may now be over, and in the face of an increasingly 
nationalistic mood among a number of member states it may view its own survival and 
continued adherence at least to basic ECHR standards as paramount. Thus, it is concluded 
that the project of using the BBoR to break the link between the courts and Strasbourg owes 
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more to opposition to the Court’s decisions than to an expectation of effecting real changes in 
rights protection in the UK. 
